The Indian Competition Commission is a proactive regulatory authority and has, in particular, taken advocacy initiatives to strengthen the debate between competition regulators in the market and potential witnesses. As a result, the number of key witnesses in India has increased exponentially, reflecting a deep awareness of the leniency system in the country. At the same time, the number of supply manipulation issues, particularly in the area of public procurement, tends to be noticed. Now more than ever, in the face of the devastation that anti-competitive activities can cause for the country`s sustainable economic development, the competition law must be brought to light. Until now, the cases of ccI were not based on evidence of an agreement, but on documents and other circumstances from which the DG was able to conclude (or refuse to conclude) that an agreement had been reached, first, and then the ICC. A simple identical pricing or parallel pricing by competitors is not enough to conclude an agreement. Parallel pricing can be an indicator of independent decisions made in a competitive market. However, the DG reviews all the circumstances related to the bids to determine if there are other indicators of collusion. The ICC judgments show that, although simple identical prices are not sufficient to prove an agreement, the addition of other indices may satisfy obesity`s probability standards. Anti-competitive agreements are also classified as horizontal and vertical agreements. In Rajasthan Cylinders (civil action 3546 / 2014), the Supreme Court found that, despite identical prices from bidders and a municipality, there had been no collusive tendering.
Parallel pricing has been attributed to the type of market, not to collusion. The leniency communication was successful, with several investigations and injunctions adopted following requests for clemency. In addition, the ICC`s recent injunctions in the leniency communication highlight the factors used by the ICC to determine the amount of reduction in the sanction, i.e. the stage of the clemency application, the standard of proof, etc. In 2018, there was a case of bid manipulation between two broadcasters, Globecast and Essel Shyam Communications Ltd (ESCL); The ICC found that the parties had violated Section 3 (3) (d) of the Competition Act by exchanging sensitive supply-related information for the purpose of broadcasting various sporting events such as cricket, Formula 1 and hockey. In particular, the ICC approved a 100% discount for Globecast for presenting evidence that would allow the ICC to form an apparent opinion on the existence of the cartel, including e-mail correspondence that articulated the offers in a concerted manner, sensitive price information and a search report with mirrors of seized laptops and mobile phones. While the ESCL provided additional information to the ICC in its application for leniency disclosure, it received only a 30% reduction, as the ICC had already referred the matter to the Director General at the time of receipt of its application. The Commission also found that such a distribution structure allowed OEMs to impose operating prices on their imprisoned consumers, increase the sales margin of automotive components relative to the cars themselves, and have potential long-term anti-competitive effects on the car market in India.